DISRUPTING THE "QUOTIDIAN": RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BREAKDOWN AND THE EMERGENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION*

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This article provides theoretical refinement and empirical specification for the breakdown variant of strain theory. It reconceptualizes the relationship between social breakdown and movement emergence in a fashion that is consistent with strands of cultural theory, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism, and that resonates with prospect theory and research on collective action in a diversity of settings. It argues that the key to the breakdown-movement relationship resides in the actual or threatened disruption of the "quotidian"—that is, the taken-for-granted routines and attitudes of everyday life. Four conditions are especially likely to disrupt the quotidian and heighten prospects of collective action: accidents that throw a community's routines into doubt and/or threaten its existence; actual or threatened intrusion into and/or violation of citizens' sense of privacy, safety, and control; alteration in subsistence routines because unfavorable ratios of resources to claimants or demand; and dramatic changes in structures of social control. The relationship between these conditions and movement emergence is elaborated by drawing on literature on the emergence of collective action in various contexts and on our field work on homeless mobilization in eight cities. We close by exploring the implications of our analysis for understanding more fully the generality of various conditions and processes commonly thought to apply to social movement emergence.

One of the older and more persistent ideas in the study of social movements is that movements have their origins in troublesome, unsettling social conditions, traditionally conceptualized as "strains." Over twenty years ago, in a review essay on strands of theory and research in collective behavior, Marx and Wood not only used the strain concept as one of their organizing themes, but concluded that the "term strain should be retained as [a] basic analytic category," and that "greater specification of the strain-movement link . . . is needed" (1975: 380, 382). In the same year, somewhat ironically, the Tillys (1975) made their now widely cited distinction between "breakdown" and "solidaristic" theories of collective action. Since then, the breakdown metaphor has supplanted the strain metaphor as a way of thinking about one set of conditions under-lying the origins of collective action. Today, neither strain theory nor the various strains that

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swere once posited to be associated with movement emergence receive much attention. The breakdown alternative, although bandied about in some of the literature, has not fared much better. Indeed, it appears as if it is a candidate for the dustbin of failed social science theories. Not only was its death knell apparently sounded when Tilly announced that the relevant ideas of Durkheim, the perspective's founding father, were "useless" (1981: chapter 4), but since then the bulk of social movement research has been animated by other theoretical and empirical concerns, namely those having to do with resource mobilization, political opportunity, framing processes, and collective identity.[1] In each instance, the traditional concern with the link between strains or breakdown and movement emergence is either secondary or sidestepped altogether.

Both the tendency to treat strains and breakdown as different metaphors for the same phenomena and the now popular assumption that the link between breakdown and movement emergence is misguided are unfortunate in several respects. For one thing, strain and breakdown are not isomorphic. The strain concept is broader and more inclusive. Breakdown, as used in the literature, is clearly a variant of strain, but not all strains can be subsumed under the rubric of breakdown. For example, conflict based on class, ethnic, and racial divisions could be construed as a variant of strain, but the underlying dynamic of intergroup tension is different from that associated with breakdown, as will be discussed shortly. Likewise, Smelser's (1962) concept of "structural strain"—one of the six necessary conditions purportedly underlying any instance of collective behavior—is broader than breakdown in that it covers all levels of social action. Secondly, the tendency to assume that breakdown bears no relationship to movement emergence is questionable because of the narrow way in which breakdown has been conceptualized. Additionally, a number of scholars have argued that the abandonment of breakdown theory is empirically premature (Piven and Cloward 1992; Useem 1980, 1985; Walsh 1981). Thus, Marx and Wood's (1975: 382) call for "greater specification of the strain-movement link" still remains current.

We attend to this call by conceiving of breakdown as a variant of strain broadly construed and by providing an alternative formulation of the breakdown concept. We do this by reconceptualizing the linkage between social breakdown and movement emergence in a fashion that fits better with the realities of the empirical world, and then illuminate and ground this theoretical recasting with qualitative empirical materials drawn from our research as well as that of others. Our objective is neither to test existing theory nor elucidate a body of data with that theory, but to elaborate and illustrate the cornerstones of a different view of breakdown as it relates to movement emergence.

Our argument is that the key to the relationship between breakdown and movement emergence resides in the "quotidian" and its actual or threatened disruption. The term quotidian derives from Latin and refers to the routines of daily life or what in sociology today is called "everyday life." We contend that the kind of breakdown most likely to be associated with movement emergence is that which penetrates and disrupts, or threatens to disrupt, taken-for-granted, everyday routines and expectancies.

In order to better understand this hypothesized link between quotidian disruption and movement emergence, we draw on prospect theory in cognitive psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Prospect theory argues that individuals are especially averse to loss and therefore will endure considerably more risk in order to preserve what they already have than they will in order to gain something new. In the more formal language of prospect theory, individuals are said to be especially risk-seeking in the contexts of loss because losses are felt more keenly as disutility than gains are felt as utility. Since quotidian

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[1] See for example recent edited volumes based on papers presented at social movement conferences (Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; and Morris and Mueller 1992).

disruptions constitute contexts of loss, we contend that they are especially likely to be generative of social movement activity.

In postulating this linkage, we do not assume that quotidian disruption covers all underlying conditions that people seek to redress through social movements. Rather, we see quotidian disruption as encompassing only one set of underlying conditions that is associated with the emergence of only one category of movements. Thus, our argument should be construed as but one step in a broader project that seeks to specify the relationship between different strain-like conditions and movement emergence.

CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF BREAKDOWN THEORY

The traditional orienting premise of breakdown theory holds that all varieties of collective action—including riots, civil disorder, social movements, and revolution—are by-products of rapid social change and disintegration. The formula advanced to account for disintegration and change varies somewhat from writer to writer, but the core argument is much the same: the sources of social cohesion and integration are weakened or destroyed by war, economic crisis, disaster, and other large-scale structural rearrangements. These cause ruptures or strains in the sociopolitical order and give rise to tensions and frustrations which incite collective action. Embedded within this orienting premise are two assumptions often associated with alternative theoretical perspectives. One focuses on the structural manifestation of breakdown at the mesolevel, as reflected in mass society theory with its emphasis on the loosening of social ties and constraints that presumably bind citizens to the larger system (Coleman 1971; Kornhauser 1959). The central idea is that individuals become more available for movement participation as their ties and commitments to community are weakened or severed. The second perspective is more individually-oriented, focusing on the social psychological consequences of disaffiliation and disintegration, which often are conceptualized as variants of alienation, deprivation, or status inconsistency. While these two perspectives are often treated as if they are disconnected, they are linked logically and theoretically inasmuch as the latter is a function or consequence of the former (Seeman 1972). Thus, the classical breakdown hypothesis is that individuals are rendered susceptible to participation in various forms of collective action by processes of social disintegration.

Although this perspective was the dominant account of movement emergence throughout the first two thirds of the twentieth century, it fell out of favor during the latter third of the century. Disenchantment was based on a number of vexing observations and issues. The first is that societies are seldom, if ever, in a state of harmonious equilibrium. Conflicts, uncertainties, and other perturbations are constant features of social life and, therefore, cannot account for the waxing and waning of social movement activity (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1214-1215). The second vexing issue is that there is no determinant relationship between breakdown conceptualized as disintegration and disaffiliation and social movement activity (Marx and Wood 1975: 380).

Equally troubling, the breakdown model has not fared well when subjected to empirical scrutiny. At the macrolevel, Tilly and his associates (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Tilly 1986) have found little support for the breakdown thesis in several European countries. Their research suggests that while large-scale changes associated with industrialization altered patterns of social organization, it was new forms of organization, with new bonds of solidarity, that were carriers of collective action. Tilly and his associates thus proffered a solidarity model of collective action in lieu of the breakdown model. Relatedly, analyses at the meso- and microlevel have been equally unsupportive of the breakdown model. Collective action participants, rather than being disconnected and

socially isolated, are typically integrated into the community in terms of both primary and secondary associations. Indeed, one of the most firmly established findings among social movement scholars is that preexisting network linkages, both interpersonal and organizational, function to channel recruitment to and participation in social movement activity (Gould 1991; McAdam 1986; Snow, Zurcher, Ekland-Olson 1980).

Finally, breakdown theory has been a victim of various fads and fashions that have been operative within the study of collective behavior and social movements as well as sociology more generally (Lofland 1990; Lofland 1993). Two outcomes of these processes are particularly relevant to the fate of breakdown theory. One ignores the questions raised by the perspective even if its answers may be empirically off track; the other scraps the perspective in its entirety because it is not in accord with more fashionable currents of work, such as those associated with the resource mobilization and political opportunity perspectives.

These various observations and currents have resulted in generalized disinterest in the hypothesized linkage between breakdown and movement emergence. Not everyone has jumped on the bandwagon, however, as there are a few voices of discontent. Some argue that critics have prematurely dismissed breakdown approaches because they have misspecified the dependent variable—norm-violating collective action (Piven and Cloward 1992). Others have empirically demonstrated the relevance of breakdown concepts for understanding nuclear accidents, antibusing movements, and prison riots (Walsh 1981; Useem 1980, 1985). Both of these cases suggest that it is premature to jettison the breakdown perspective.

Based on our reading of this literature and our research on the emergence of social movements among the homeless across the country, we agree that the baby has been thrown out with the bath water and that the breakdown metaphor continues to have analytic utility. Our aim is to reconsider the issue of breakdown, not by reassessing empirically the classical breakdown argument, but by reconceptualizing the breakdown concept so that it is directly relevant to everyday lives and routines. This reconceptualization is empirically consistent with an array of research on the emergence of collective action, and is compatible with the idea of solidarity.

THE QUOTIDIAN AND ITS DISRUPTION

The term quotidian derives from Latin and refers to the routines of daily life. It is our contention, as well as that of a number of other students of collective action (Flacks 1988; Johnston 1991; Lefebvre 1971; Roberts and Kloss 1979), that the kinds of dislocations most likely to be associated with collective action mobilization are those that disrupt or threaten to disrupt the quotidian—that is, the taken-for-granted substrate of everyday life. As Johnston observed in his analysis of the development of broad-based opposition to the Franco regime in the Catalonia region of Spain from 1939 to 1979: "no grievances" were "more pressing or meaningful than the ones grounded in everyday experience, especially the ones that render(ed) the routine accomplishments of daily business problematic" (Johnston 1991:54). Likewise, Flacks contends that "the most likely circumstance in which collective mobilization occurs is a situation of perceived threat to accustomed patterns of everyday life" (1988: 71).[2]

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[2] The concept of "threat," whether actual or perceived, has figured in the work of others. Tilly (1978) regards threat as a trigger for mobilization, defining it in terms of "the extent to which other groups are threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests" (133). The problem, we believe, is that the connection between interests and specific kinds of collective action are left indeterminant. In contrast, we

Although these discussions highlight the link between mobilization and quotidian disruption, they do not extend the theoretical implications of their observations. Furthermore, they tend to gloss everyday life inasmuch as they do not clearly specify the key constituent parts that are disrupted. Borrowing on strands of cultural theory, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism, we conceptualize everyday life in terms of two constituent dimensions: daily practices or routines, and the natural attitude. The empirical referent for daily practices are the routinized patterns of making do, such as daily subsistence routines and chores, that are often performed in an almost habituated, unthinking fashion (Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1983; Williams 1973). They will vary for people situated differently in the social structure, of course. The habituated routines of middle- and upper-middle class homeowners, for example, will be strikingly different from those of lower-class folks. Even groups on the margins, such as the homeless, may develop daily subsistence routines. These routines may be economically, politically, or morally aberrant and demeaning, but they may be pursued in a predictable and habituated fashion suggestive of a taken-for-granted moral order (Snow and Anderson 1993).

The natural attitude (Schutz 1962, 1964)—also referred to as the attitude of everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966)—is the cognitive component of the quotidian. It refers to the customary orientation of people in the course of everyday life, to their routinized expectancies. It is characterized by what Schutz (1962, 1964) called the "suspension of doubt." This means that things are taken-for-granted; they are not seen as problematic; they are approached and accomplished in an almost unreflective and mechanical manner. Schutz contrasts this natural attitude to a scientific attitude, which is characterized by the "suspension of belief," such that whatever one was doing, or had grown accustomed to, is now problematic. Whereas the natural attitude is associated with a sense that "nothing unusual is happening" (Emerson 1970), the scientific attitude is associated with the sense that something out of the ordinary is occurring or is about to occur. When this happens outside of the organizational context of routine science, it is because the natural attitude is disrupted and things can no longer be taken-for-granted.

The quotidian thus refers to the state of being in which things are done in a taken-for-granted way; it involves the routinization of everyday life both behaviorally and cognitively. It is analogous to what Mead referred to as the "specious present" (1938: 220-223) and can be contrasted to what might be thought of as the problematic present. In the specious present doubts, uncertainties, and inhibitions are not at the forefront of consciousness, and action is largely habituated and routinized (see Miller 1973: 38-41); in the problematic present action is inhibited, routine is stymied, and uncertainties emerge. The problematic present thus arises when the specious present, or the quotidian, is disrupted.

When the quotidian is disrupted, then, routinized patterns of action are rendered problematic and the natural attitude is fractured. Routines and understandings associated with everyday patterns of making do are now matters of doubt, uncertainty, and sometimes even confusion. Since this disruption can occur at a purely individual level, as when one gets into a traffic accident and becomes excessively anxious about driving, it is necessary, if

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focus on one kind or set of interests—those having to do with everyday routines and their maintenance—and their association with movements thought to be more reactive than proactive.

collective action is to occur, that the disruption be experienced collectively and its repair through institutional channels be seen as unlikely.

The question arises as to whether there are some kinds of events that are more likely than others to lead to the disruption of the quotidian in a fashion conducive to the emergence of social movement activity. We have identified four such categories of events: community disrupting accidents and disasters; actual or threatened intrusion into or violation of culturally defined zones of privacy and control; alteration of taken-for-granted subsistence routines as a result of an emergent disparity between available resources and resource demand; and dramatic changes in structures of social control. Drawing on literature on the emergence of collective action in a variety of contexts and on the findings of our study of homeless mobilization in eight U.S. cities during the 1980s and early 1990s we elaborate and ground empirically these four categories of disrupting events and specify their linkage to movement emergence.[3]

EVENTS CONDUCIVE TO QUOTIDIAN DISRUPTION

Quotidian Disrupting Accidents

One category of disrupting events includes accidents that throw a community's routines into doubt and/or that threaten a community's existence. One widely researched accident that had this effect was the 1979 partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor in the Three Mile Island area of eastern Pennsylvania. Walsh (1981, 1988) did extensive research on the communities in the area and described citizens' responses, both individual and collective. Among his findings, three are particularly pertinent to our thesis. First, a number of antinuclear organizations were operative in the area prior to the accident, but they "had little success mobilizing the local population against the twin reactors of the island" until after the accident (Walsh 1981: 18). The near-meltdown shattered, albeit temporarily, the daily routines of many residents. Not only were "more than 200,000 people within a twenty-five mile radius of TMI evacuated during the first few days of the accident" (Walsh 1988: 37), but the accident and evacuation left many residents with a sense that their personal lifeworlds were crumbling before their very eyes. As one resident put it: "On Friday, all hell broke loose" (Walsh 1988: 39). And another added that "Friday stands out in my mind as a day of chaos I could never again live through" (Walsh 1988: 41). As a result of this chaos, Walsh noted: "Evacuees left large portions of themselves behind—not only their homes and all the memories associated with them, but also their jobs, neighbors, and many other

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[3] Two considerations guided the literature search: (1) detailed descriptions of collective action and its preceding events; and (2) coverage of a variety of contexts and collective actors. Regarding (2), we were not concerned with exhaustiveness or coverage of the entire corpus of literature associated with a particular context, since our interest was in theoretical development and refinement rather than testing. The second data source comes from a national study of homeless protest activity in the U.S. during the 1980s and earlier 1990s. As part of that project, fieldwork was conducted in eight U.S. cities—Boston, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Minneapolis, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Tucson—to understand homeless mobilization. For a detailed discussion of the project, including sampling issues and fieldwork procedures, see Cress and Snow (1996). This field data allowed us to overcome a major shortcoming of most research invoking strain and/or breakdown explanations for emergence: we were able to observe quotidian disruption as they were experienced by homeless individuals and/or organizational representatives. Assessment of classical strain and breakdown work tends to infer the effects of strain on individuals or groups from aggregate indicators. This overlooks the different effects that disruption might have on different segments of a population. If quotidian disruption helps explain at least one variety of movement emergence, then it is imperative to have detailed accounts of the impact of disrupting events on the lives and routines of the individuals and organizations affected. The historical and ethnographic studies on which we draw provide such detailed accounts.

personal symbols of meaningful existence" (1988: 42). Even social support personnel, who were charged with encouraging their clients trust in public officials, could not withstand the thoroughly disruptive character of the accident. As one mental health therapist recalled:

> I reassured a patient in my Thursday evening group who was very upset
> about events at the island, suggesting that his fears were exaggerated. As
> it turned out, his fear was quite legitimate and I was wrong for trying to
> eliminate it. I've lost so much with that accident! I've much less trust in
> public officials at all levels. I just don't know what to believe any more. . .
> (Walsh 1988: 43).

As noted above, prior to the TMI accident, local antinuclear organizations had trouble recruiting volunteers. After the accident, however, many residents attended public meetings concerning TMI and became active in anti-TMI and antinuclear organizations. Thus, "the accident and evacuation were central to the transformation of conservative TMI communities into hotbeds of antinuclear activism" (Walsh 1988: 61).

The second observation of Walsh's pertinent to our thesis concerns his phrase "suddenly imposed grievances" to capture the sense of immediate threat that the accident posed to the surrounding communities (1981: 18) Walsh argues that insofar as grievances are sudden, they are more likely to trigger collection action, and that accidents are particularly likely to generate sudden grievances. However, we contend that the emphasis on "suddenness" glosses what is critical about such accidents: it is not their suddenness that generates collective action but rather the disruption of the daily order of things. This was clearly indicated by the finding that those who evacuated during the emergency period were more likely to become anti-TMI activists than those "who remained home during the emergency period" (1988: 158). Thus, those whose lives were most disrupted during the emergency period, and whose cognitive templates were most likely to be fractured, were the ones most likely to become activists.

Lastly, we agree with Walsh's contention that any number of technical accidents attributable to human negligence and error, such as oil spills, could generate grievances associated with collective action (Walsh 1981: 18), but only insofar as the accidents are disruptive of the quotidian. Those that are not, no matter how sudden their materialization, are not likely to generate grievances associated with collective action. The other proviso, that Walsh acknowledges, is that responsibility for the accident be attributable to human agency rather than forces of nature or "acts of God." This is partly an issue of social construction and framing, but not fully. Previous research on collective blaming has found repeatedly that it is most likely to occur when the incident in question can be clearly attributed to human negligence or error (Bucher 1957; Drabek and Quarantelli 1967).

In light of these observations, we suggest the following proposition regarding the relationship among accidents, quotidian disruption, and collective action:

> 1. Accidents are especially likely to generate collective action insofar as they (a)
> disrupt the quotidian, and (b) can be attributed to human negligence and/or error
> rather than to natural forces or "acts of God."

Intrusion into or Violation of the Protective Surround or Umwelt

A second category of disruptive events is constituted by actual or threatened intrusions into or violations of what Goffman (1971) referred to as the immediate protective surround or *Umwelt*. The concept of *Umwelt* is borrowed from ethologists to refer the area

around animals within which there is a sense of ease and safety unless signals of alarm indicate otherwise (Goffman 1971: 248-256). Extended to humans, the *Umwelt* can be thought of as a culturally elastic zone of privacy and control regarded as out of bounds to the uninvited, strangers, and corporate and governmental agents. It is a kind of culturally protective bubble that defines a set of choices and actions as the sacred province of those within this bubble or zone. Words such as "family," "home," and "neighborhood" insinuate the existence of such culturally inviolable zones, as evidenced by the tendency within moral philosophy, literature and poetry, and law to regard their actual or threatened violation as taboo and almost sacrilege.[4] Thus, assuming citizens' family, home, and neighborhood are regarded in a similar fashion, their intrusion and/or violation constitute quotidian disruption and the stuff of which social movements are born.

Examples of this phenomenon are abundant. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, emerged after a grieving and outraged mother whose teenage daughter was killed by a drunken driver began to organize against this kind of slaughter of innocent loved ones and bystanders. The movement was not just against drunk driving, but extended the reach of parents to protect their unsuspecting children (McCarthy 1994). Similarly, antibusing movements surfaced in many cities across the country in the 1970s in an attempt of parents to regain control of what they saw as fundamental to both parenthood and family: the decision of where one's children should and can go to school (Rubin 1972; Useem 1980). The point in both cases is that there is a kind of parental *Umwelt* that expands and contracts with the coming and going of children, and when that is threatened or violated, parents are likely to act to regain control and reconstitute that protective bubble or zone.

Further illustration is provided by community and neighborhood movements that cluster together under the acronym NIMBY, which stands for "not in my backyard." Across the country, proposed halfway houses, group homes, restitution centers, soup kitchens and shelters, and toxic waste dumps have all prompted NIMBY mobilization. Why? Because such facilities and/or the people they serve are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as direct threats to the community or neighborhood *Umwelt*, and thus to the quotidian. This is clearly illustrated in Snow and Anderson's discussion of the relocation efforts of Austin's Salvation Army (Sally) in the mid-1980s.

> The path to a new site was thorny, engendering rancorous community opposition as it wound its way through one prospective neighborhood after another. . . . Underlying citizen opposition to the "frightening possibility" of the Sally relocating nearby was the repeatedly voiced fear that "thousands of womenless, homeless men" would inundate their

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[4] For a similar interpretation of Goffman's discussion of the umwelt in relation to humans and human interaction, see Burns (1992). As he writes: "In modern society, the individuals *Umwelt* is often prescribed by the built environment—his room, his house, workplace, office, or some familiar haunt other than these. These are likely to be assumed to be unhazardous and innocent," unless they are invaded or violated (Burns 1992: 99).

> neighborhoods and "rob their homes" and "rape the women." Thus, in one prospective neighborhood, signs were hung on the door asking, "Do you want your women raped and your children mauled." In another, residents appeared before the city council carrying placards that read "Vagrance (sic) and kids don't mix," and gave testimony highlighting the threat to women and children posed by the homeless (1993: 97).

The result of the successive surges of neighborhood protest was that the Salvation Army was neither relocated in or nearby residential neighborhoods. Residents could therefore resume their daily routines in the manner to which they had grown accustomed.

In the case of NIMBY mobilization, busing boycotts, and citizens' movements against drunk driving, collective action participants perceived themselves, their families, and their neighborhoods as being violated and victimized by intrusive citizens, or by corporate or governmental initiatives, in a fashion that threatens citizens' control of their own lives and thus disruption of the quotidian. Hence, the following proposition:

> 2. Actual or threatened intrusion into culturally defined zones of privacy and control by strangers, uninvited persons, corporate and/or governmental agents is likely, all else being equal, to generate collective action to reestablish the zone of privacy and control.

Changes in Taken-For-Granted Subsistence Routines

Other events that are equally disruptive of the quotidian involve dramatic alterations in subsistence routines because of a decrease in available resources relative to resource demand. Demand may change due to variations in routinized expectations or as a result of increases or decreases in the number of resource claimants.[5] Taking these sources of demand fluctuation into account, there are at least three major ways in which the taken-for-granted ratio of resources to demand varies. As shown in table 1: resources decline while demand remains relatively constant (cell 2); demand increases while resources

Table 1. The Relationship between Resources, Demand, and Collective Action

Resources	*Claimants/Demand*	
	Constant	Increase
Constant	(1) No Disruption Collective Action Unlikely	(3) Disruption Collective Action Likely
Increase	(2) Diruption Collective Action Likely	(4) Disruption Collective Action Likely

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[5] Here we focus on the actual fluctuation in resources relative to demand, and not changes in subjective expectations or assessments. The latter lead us to consider relative deprivation, which has been found to be tenuously connected to collective action (Finkel and Rile 1986; Gurney and Tierney 1982).

resources remain relatively constant (cell 3); or resources decline while demand increases (cell 4). In each of the situations, the quotidian is disrupted inasmuch as people find that they can no longer make do in the fashion to which they have grown accustomed. Below we clarify the disjunction between resources and demand by illustrating Cells 2 and 3.

Resources Decline But Claimants Remain Constant. Much of the literature on peasant rebellions and movements highlights the centrality of a declining resource base, and resultant alteration in subsistence routines and expectancies, in relation to collective action (Paige 1975; Scott 1976; Wolf 1969). A case in point is Scott's (1976) examination of events leading up to peasant rebellions in colonial Vietnam and Lower Burma in 1930 and 1931. Scott notes that the peasant is not troubled so much by economic exploitation so long as there are enough resources to meet subsistence needs. Since reliable subsistence is the "primordial goal of the peasant cultivator," the peasant asks "how much is left before he asks how much is taken" (Scott 1976: 5, 31). Thus, Scott argues that it is not exploitation or deprivation per se that is unsettling to the peasant, but actual or threatened disruptions to the peasants' subsistence routines.

> As peasants experience it, then, the *manner* of exploitation may well make all the difference in the world. Forms of exploitation that tend to offer built-in subsistence security and which, in this sense, adapt themselves to the central dilemma of peasant economies are. . . far less maligned than claims which are heedless of minimum peasant standards (Scott 1976: 32).

Thus, state taxation and landlord claims to peasant harvests that vary according to the size of the harvest are more palatable to peasants than inflexible, fixed claims and taxes that appropriate the same amount of peasant wealth regardless of harvest size. In Lower Burma, for example, the Saya San rebellion erupted in December 1930 just after an economic crisis hit the region and just before the collection of the capitation tax:

> It was not a question of outright starvation. . . . Rather it meant a massive and collective decline in a standard of living and an economic security which had for some time been deteriorating. It meant for many a precipitate fall from smallholding or tenancy into the ranks of day labors. It meant for tenants a dramatic worsening of their terms of exchange with landowners as rents held steady against their diminishing income and customary production credit was revoked (Scott 1976: 151).

Based on such observations, Scott concludes that change or exploitation is likely to be particularly volatile when it "threatens existing subsistence arrangements" (1976: 193)— which is to say that collective action, at least in the locales studied, was most likely when, all other things being equal, daily routines were disrupted.

The same dynamic was operative in the food riots and protests of urban and rural poor in early modern Europe (Rudé 1964; Tilly 1975, 1979; Thompson 1971). Writing about the French rural riots of the 18th century, Rudé (1964) notes that they were typically occasioned by food shortages that threatened hunger.

> In fact, whenever harvests were bad, or when the needs of war or a breakdown in communication led to shortage, hoarding, or panic buying, a large part of the rural population, like their fellows in the cities, were threatened with hunger; and on such occasions many would demonstrate

> in markets or at bakers' shops, or resort to more violent action by
> stopping food convoys on the roads and rivers, pillaging supplies, or
> compelling shopkeepers, millers, farmers, and merchants to sell their
> wares at lower prices, or the authorities to intervene on behalf of the
> small consumers (1964: 21).

Although Rudé did not explicitly use the language of quotidian disruption, there can be no doubt that is what was at issue. Nothing was more fundamental to the subsistence of the rural populace of this era than the stable provision of food.

A final illustration of the link between collective action and resource loss is provided by the various farmers' movements that surfaced throughout the south and the midwest in the U.S. in the late 1800s. Although local and regional factors accounted for differences among some of these movements, most were responding in part to broader, national changes that made it increasingly difficult for farmers to pursue their livelihood in a fashion they had grown accustomed to and come to take for granted. As McNall (1988) found in his study of the Farmer's Alliance in Kansas, farmers were confronted with the confluence of forces that altered dramatically the character of their livelihood. The socioeconomic forces included: wealthy railroad companies that charged high rates for transporting farm goods and often monopolized available grain elevators; railroad lines and speculators who controlled so much high quality farm land that farmers often had to buy land from them at inflated prices; and an impersonal market that made the link between hard work and survival even more tenuous than it otherwise would have been. McNall also notes that the situation of farmers was worsened by the demonetization of silver in the mid-1870s which resulted in a six-year depression that lowered the price farmers received for their crops. But McNall makes clear that farmers were responding to more than just a drop in the price of their crops:

> The farmer was reacting to a commodification of land, labor, and money,
> to the shift from a system in which he produced for local markets to one
> in which his welfare was dependent on his being a businessman (1988:
> 45).

In short, what in the past yielded satisfactory subsistence for the midwestern farmer no longer did so. He now had to do things differently in order to survive. The result was the flowering of the Farmer's Alliance movement and support for the burgeoning Populist Party. As in the previous cases, we here see that it is not socioeconomic forces per se that lead to collective action, but primarily dramatic alterations in or loss of the taken-for-granted ways of life.

Together, these illustrations suggest the following proposition about the relationship among resource base, quotidian disruption, and collective action:

> 3. Alteration in taken-for-granted subsistence routines and expectancies due to a
> declining resource base is likely, all else being equal, to be associated with the
> emergence of collective action that seeks to restore the previous balance between
> resource level and subsistence routines.

Claimants Increase But Resources Remain Constant. Collective action may also occur when claimants can no longer pursue their daily routines because their numbers exceed available resources. In other words, because the carrying capacity of the socioeconomic environment has been stretched by an increasing number of claimants,

taken-for-granted subsistence routines are disrupted. In many respects, this disjunction between claimants and resources is at the core of Goldstone's (1991) demographic/ structural explanation of popular uprisings and state breakdown in Eurasia from 1500 to 1850.

> Put simply, large agrarian states of this period were not equipped to deal with the impact of the steady growth of population that then began throughout northern Eurasia, eventually amounting to population increases in excess of the productivity gains of the land (Goldstone 1991: 24).

This process made it increasingly difficult for large numbers of people to subsist in their accustomed, albeit meager, fashion. As well, certain classes of people could no longer assume their taken-for-granted roles. Employment for the professional classes and state jobs for nobility, for example, became highly uncertain as mounting population pressures taxed state authority. In turn, these disrupted expectancies and routines facilitated the involvement of these classes in revolutionary activity.

This disparity between an increasing number of claimants and their resource base was strikingly evident in our research on homeless social movement activity across American cities in the 1980s and early 1990s. In our fieldwork among fifteen homeless social movement organizations in eight U.S. cities, we found that in ten of the cases initial mobilization was prompted in part or fully by the disruption of either individual or organizational routines.[6]

In the case of the disruption of individual routines, the typical scenario was that one or more homeless individuals found it increasingly difficult to negotiate their daily routines, and that this jolt became a kind of consciousness-raising experience that pushed some in the direction of collective action. Because of increasing numbers of homeless claimants, taken-for-granted routines, such as standing in line at soup kitchens and shelters, no longer guaranteed the expected outcome. One service provider in Philadelphia explained this when discussing a homeless individual who helped begin both the local homeless movement and the National Union of the Homeless:

> To get into the shelter, you had to wait in line, and if they fill up, you're just out of luck. Now these lines were not well supervised, so the bigger guys would fight their way in. Chris is a big guy, and it really ripped him up to have to fight other men so that he could sleep indoors on a floor.

It was in response to this "survival of the fittest" ambience that rendered questionable previously taken-for-granted survival routines that the founder of the Philadelphia movement decided he had enough and began to appeal to other homeless individuals and selected social service providers that the time had come to organize. It was out of this experience that the National Union of the Homeless surfaced in Philadelphia in 1986, and began to reach out to homeless in other cities who were similarly experiencing a disruption of their

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[6] Examination of the underlying, precipitating conditions associated with the emergence of each of the fifteen SMOs revealed four sets of such conditions: individual or organizational disruption, diffusion from and sponsorship by another organization, factionalism, and a combination of disruption and one of the other two conditions. The emergence of six of the SMOs was sparked by disruption, three were the direct outgrowth of diffusion and sponsorship, two were factional offsprings, and four emerged as a result of a mixture of disruption and either factionalism or diffusion/sponsorship. Since our focus is on the connection between quotidian disruption and SMO emergence, we elaborate this relationship.

subsistence routines.

Such cases are particularly interesting because they show that it was not the dire poverty and deprivation of homeless individuals that initially pushed them toward collective action; rather, it was the disruption of habituated survival routines occasioned by the disjunction between resource availability and increasing numbers of claimants. Had some of these individuals been able to continue to subsist in the manner to which they had become accustomed, presumably they would not have become initiators and organizers of collective action.

In the case of the emergence of a number of other homeless SMOs, it was the disruption of extant organizational routines that was pivotal. Street-level social service agencies attending to the subsistence needs of the homeless typically found that they were being overwhelmed by a disjunction between an escalating demand for their services and their ability to meet those demands because of a stagnant or declining resource base. They were experiencing a kind of system overload which made it exceedingly difficult to attend to the needs of their growing client pool and, more generally, to discharge their mission. It was in the face of this organizational disruption that agency leaders in five of the eight cities spearheaded the development of homeless collective action campaigns.

The emergence of the Alliance of the Streets, a homeless SMO in Minneapolis, is a case in point. Minneapolis, like many other cities, witnessed an explosion in its homeless population during the 1980s. While shelter capacity in Minneapolis grew ten-fold during the decade, from one hundred beds in 1980 to over one thousand by 1989, the need for shelter space increased steadily each year as well, with most shelters operating at capacity. This was particularly true of "free" shelters, which were not under contract with the county and which were preferred by many homeless because there was less paperwork and they were smaller than the county shelters. As a result, the demand for free shelters often exceeded capacity.

Illustrative of this dilemma was St. Steven's shelter, a free shelter that housed thirty men per night. It first began sheltering homeless people in 1982, and added a meal program two years later, which increased the number of poor and homeless receiving services. But even this expansion was not sufficient, as St. Steven's shelter and food programs became increasingly inundated with poor and homeless people in need of services. Not only was the mission of the church being challenged, but so was the subsistence of its growing constituency. Thus, as the ranks of the homeless increased and the demand for resources exceeded their availability, the need for collective action to help combat the problem became increasingly evident. And it was in this context that Alliance of the Streets was born in the spring of 1986. Founded with the assistance of St. Steven's and led by homeless residents of the shelter, the SMO immediately began working against the destruction of low-cost housing, for the improvement of police-homeless relations, and for the provision of more resources for facilities such as St. Steven's.

A similar disparity existed in Tucson, where increasing numbers of homeless people during the 1980s overwhelmed the local social service system. The locus of homeless movement activity occurred in the orbit of the local Catholic Worker community known as Casa Maria. As a lay ministry dedicated to living the social gospel, Casa Maria had a history of participation in peace and justice concerns, including the sanctuary movement, the antinuclear movement, and divestment from South Africa. In addition, they operated a soup kitchen and clothing closet for the local poor.

In 1985, three events prompted Casa Maria to redefine the focus of its ministry. First, there was a dramatic increase in the numbers of people eating lunch at the soup kitchen. This coincided with a much publicized United Way report estimating the number of homeless people in Tucson had grown by several thousand. A short time later, another

local soup kitchen was closed because of public outcry over "the climate of fear" caused by the increasing numbers of homeless people congregating in the area (Hostetler 1986). This functioned as a significant consciousness-raising event for Casa Maria. As one of its leaders explained: "With the closing of St. Martin's we realized that there was a prevailing hostile attitude toward the homeless and that attitude needed to be fought."

The increasing numbers of homeless people strained the resources of the kitchen, highlighted the dire conditions of Tucson's expanding poor population, and underscored the limitations of service provision for affecting change. These events, coupled with St. Martin's closing, combined to alter business as usual at Casa Maria. The result was a shift in Casa Maria's generalized activism to concentrated concern with the poverty and injustice experienced by the homeless. As another leader put it: "We had been focusing on all these grand global issues like apartheid. But we began to realize that apartheid was happening right here in front of us." Thus, Casa Maria began organizing homeless people in the latter part of 1986. Out of that effort, the Tucson Union of the Homeless was born.

In both Minneapolis and Tucson, as well as in other cities, homeless collective action was spawned by the disruption of organizational routines that resulted from a kind of system overload. These service organizations simply could not accommodate the growing number of homeless given their insufficient resource base.

Thus, in the cases of both homeless individuals and agencies that were initiators of homeless social movement activity, the turning point was those events that disrupted the quotidian. Accordingly, we suggest the following proposition:

> 4. Alteration in taken-for-granted subsistence routines and expectancies due to an increase in claimants (demand) in relation to available resources is likely, all else being equal, to be associated with the emergence of collective action that seeks to redress the imbalance between claimants and resources.

Dramatic Changes in Structures of Social Control

A fourth way in which quotidian disruption may lead to collective action is when everyday routines are shattered by dramatic changes in existing structures of social organization and control. This is especially likely when structures of control are highly regimented, as is typically the case in the context of total institutions, such as asylums and prisons. What makes these contexts vulnerable to changes in the basis of control is that daily routines and rhythms are carefully synchronized with the system of control.

This finely tuned relationship and its vulnerability to disruption by changes in control is evident in research on prison insurrections and riots. Useem and Kimball's (1991) study of U.S. prison riots in the 1970s and 1980s is especially illustrative, as several of the riots studied—Joliet and West Virginia—were clearly triggered by changes in existing structures of control. Inmate life in the Joliet prison in Illinois was controlled informally but fairly tightly by four inmate gangs from late 1969 to December 1974. Prisoners there had more freedoms than in many other prisons, but only insofar as those freedoms were in accord with the interests of the dominant gangs. Moreover, gang members had better lives than non-gang members, who sometimes had to pay protection money, run gang errands, or provide sexual favors to gang members. This system of informal control was rooted in the warden's creation of an inmate council to increase inmate-administration communications. However, the council was dominated by the gangs, and its executive committee members were allowed to move freely throughout the prison. Other gang members were given special privileges such as photo service and soft drinks. Moreover, one gang, the Blackstone

Rangers, was able to get itself recognized as a religious organization called Beni-Zaken. Since Joliet allowed inmates unlimited visits with religious leaders, the leader of the Rangers both inside and outside the prison was able to spend eight hours a day, three to four days a week, meeting with non-inmate gang members posing as Beni-Zaken ministers. This allowed the Ranger leader to maintain power in Joliet, as well as in other prisons and on the streets of Chicago. As a result, gang members "openly defied guards. . . staff was fearful of coming to work" and sometimes, "Joliet officials dismissed disciplinary charges to avoid precipitating a riot" (Useem and Kimball 1991: 62).

A riot occurred in April 1975, however, shortly after a new warden came aboard in December 1974. The new warden immediately began to curtail inmate freedoms and dismantle the structure of informal control by gang members, and soon afterwards prisoners rebelled. As Useem and Kimball note, it was a "reversal of this policy [that] precipitated the rebellion" (1991: 59). Thus, the riot was triggered by changes in the structure of control that altered dramatically the routine grounds of everyday inmate life.

A change in wardens and methods of social control in the West Virginia Penitentiary similarly resulted in the breakdown of everyday routines that culminated in the 1986 inmate takeover of the prison. In 1979 a new warden came aboard after fifteen prisoners had escaped due to extremely lax social control. Although the new warden was very strict, he gained the respect of both inmates and guards because of his scrutiny and enforcement of guard activity. Corrupt guards were fired, abusive treatment of inmates was banned, and inmates were granted more freedom to move about the prison. All of this changed in September 1985, when a stern and uncompromising deputy warden was promoted to warden. Among other things, he instituted a series of changes that included stricter visitation rules, a prohibition on packages from ex-inmates and family members, a new humiliating procedure for inmates in maximum security, and a reduction in the personal property inmates could have in their cells (Useem and Kimball 1991: 176-177). Fearing further changes in their daily prison lives, inmates rebelled and took over the prison on the evening of January 1, 1986.

These two cases clearly demonstrate how the alteration of interconnected systems of formal and informal control and associated daily routines can provide the impetus for collective action. Not only were everyday routines and taken-for-granted privileges disrupted in both prisons, but in one, changes in the structure of social control directly undermined the power of specific gangs and gang members who played a significant role in the eventual riot.

Dramatic changes in the control and policing of noninstitutionalized citizens can also spur mobilization when those changes alter or threaten to alter the routine grounds of everyday life. This was evident in the case of the homeless on a number of occasions in a number of cities. One of the initial mobilizations of homeless people in the Boston area, for example, was sparked by changes in policing practices with respect to the homeless hanging out in the Boston Common. This was explained by a leader of the Homeless Civil Rights Project (HCRP), a social movement organization that originally mobilized over civil liberty violations of the homeless:

> If you were up in the Boston Common and if you were perceived as homeless you were going to get kicked off the benches. You couldn't even sit. You didn't have to be drinking. They kicked you off the benches because they didn't think it was your park.... The police had a guy who was infamous among homeless circles. He was called Robo Cop. He was a Boston motorcycle cop and his beat was the Common and downtown.

> … He was convinced that he had the right to kick you out of the park
> because it was his park and not yours. His other name was Officer
> Friendly because when he first came on to you, he'd say: "Hi guys, how
> are your doing today? You know, its a nice day. Listen, I'll be back in 10
> minutes and you better be gone, okay?" Very nice, but when he came
> back 10 minutes later, he'd . . . manhandle you, arrest ya. And if you said,
> "Gee, I ain't doing nothing," he'd go into a trash barrel and come out with
> an empty bottle and say: "public drinking." [. . .] He absolutely terrorized
> people.

And in doing so, Robo Cop, along with the transit police who were patrolling the subway stations to keep the homeless out, not only disrupted the routines of the homeless in the Common's area, but made it difficult to establish a new set of routines. It was in response to this escalation of aggressive policing that HCRP was formed, with many of the targeted homeless joining its ranks.

Similarly, when the City Council of Tucson voted in March 1996 to shut down a long-time homeless encampment adjacent to a residential neighborhood, previously apathetic homeless individuals quickly mobilized to protest the decision and salvage their makeshift shantytown. One five-year resident of the camp asked rhetorically:

> What else can we do? If they boot us out, where are we going to go? This
> is all we have. We can't let the city take it from us without giving us
> another place to stay!

Taken together, the foregoing observations suggest the following proposition regarding the relationship among changes in structures of social control, quotidian disruption, and collective action:

> 5. Changes in structures of social control that necessitate abandonment or
> alteration of daily routines, and thereby disrupt the quotidian, are likely, all else
> being equal, to be associated with the emergence of collective action that seeks to
> thwart, rescind, or modify the new structure of control

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding pages we have attempted to reconceptualize the relationship between social breakdown and movement emergence in a fashion that fits better with the realities of the empirical world, which is consistent with strands of cultural theory, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism, and which resonates with research on the empirical locus of collective action in a diverse array of settings. Specifically, we have argued, first, that the key to understanding the relationship between breakdown and movement emergence resides in the actual or threatened disruption of the "quotidian"—that is, in the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life; and secondly, that four sets of conditions are especially likely to cause quotidian disruption. They include: accidents that throw a community's routines into doubt and/or threaten its existence; the actual or threatened intrusion into and/or violation of citizens sense of privacy, safety, and control; alteration in subsistence routines because of a decrease in the ratio of resources to claimants or demand; and dramatic changes in structures of social control. These events disrupt the quotidian and heighten the prospect of collective action.

Although we have elaborated empirically four sets of conditions that give rise to quotidian disruption and demonstrated their link to collective action, it is reasonable to ask why we should expect quotidian disruption to be an especially potent trigger of collective action, all other things being equal? The answer is provided in part by the conjunction of Tilly's (1978) theorization of the relationship between threat, opportunity, and collective action, and Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In exploring the relative contributions of threat and opportunity to collective action, Tilly suggests that the relationship is asymmetrical, with threat likely "to generate more collective action than the 'same' amount of opportunity" (1978: 134-135). From the vantage point of prospect theory, the reason for this is that individuals are especially risk-seeking in contexts of loss because losses are felt much more keenly as disutility than gains are felt as utility (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). When applied to individuals experiencing actual or prospective quotidian disruption—clearly a context of loss—this suggests that they should be powerfully motivated to engage in collective action to reconstitute the quotidian and recoup what they have lost, or preserve the routinized order of things and thus protect what they have.

These observations, in conjunction with our hypotheses regarding quotidian disruption, help us to understand more fully various conditions associated with movement emergence. In particular, they suggest that much of what is theorized and asserted about rationality, political opportunities, framing processes, and collective identity may be subject to modification in the case of collective action that arises out of quotidian disruption and therefore may be overgeneralized.

First, the linkage of prospect theory and our conceptualization of quotidian disruption leads to a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of rationality than has generally been presented in the field. Consistent with Olson's free-rider dilemma (1965), prospect theory suggests that considerable effort is typically necessary to overcome thresholds to most collective action because people are averse to losing what they have in order to risk social movement involvement. Previous research and theory insinuates that situations are framed in a fashion that calls for collective action, collective identities are developed and deployed, and resources are mobilized in order to a overcome the loss aversion that potential participants will presumably experience. When the quotidian is disrupted, however, we suspect the calculus for action is reversed. Instead of movements needing to motivate individuals to overcome the risks often associated with movement participation, quotidian disruption is likely to provide sufficient motivation for participation. As Walder noted in his application of prospect theory to social movements, "those threatened with, or who are experiencing, a loss relative to their accustomed states are more likely than others to feel an acute sense of injustice and moral outrage, and will be more likely to engage in risky contributions to movements of protest" (1994: 9). Thus, prospect theory implies that social movement participants who are motivated by the loss of existing utility will have lower thresholds for collective action than participants in movements which promise the attainment of new benefits in the future. At the same time, our hypotheses regarding the link between quotidian disruption and movement emergence refine the hypothesized relationship between prospect theory and collective action by specifying the kinds of contexts or situations in which loss is most likely to be felt.

Turning to the role of political opportunities in movement emergence and participation, our observations suggest that the perception of political opportunities and their objective reality may be quite variable across different categories of social movements. Since most movements that arise for reasons other than quotidian disruption pursue goals which have not yet been realized, individuals and groups are likely to calculate whether to participate by comparing what they stand to lose with what they are likely to gain. Since

prospect theory predicts that people will be loss-averse, prospective participants in these movements will, hypothetically, be rather circumspect and conservative in assessing the political opportunities before them. Furthermore, to the extent that cultural work is necessary to alter the tendency to assess political opportunities conservatively and to lower thresholds for participation, movements not based on quotidian disruption should be rich in the cultural work of framing and identity construction. On the other hand, for movements prompted by quotidian disruption, political opportunities may well be exaggerated because of the prospect of loss. This appears to be what Kurzman (1996) found in his study of the Iranian Revolution, in which some participants perceived opportunities that did not objectively exist, and in the process helped to create them. "Liberals," he reports, "were highly sensitive to the structure of opportunities" (1996: 162), modifying their level of protest in tandem with the level of state repression; but the process was often reversed for religious traditionalists, for whom "acts of repression that hit close to home were a major source of revolutionary zeal" and increased militancy (1996: 161). This suggests that the assessment of political opportunities may vary dramatically between those challenging a regime to create a new society and those challenging it to restore a way of life, with the former sensitive to political opportunities due to their aversion to losing what they already have and the latter acting less cautiously towards political opportunities in an effort to restore what they once had.

The foregoing observations also help us to refine and contextualize our under-standing of framing processes in relation to social movements. First, our hypotheses suggest a modification of prospect theory's emphasis on the development of loss frames in relation to the likelihood of collective action (see Berejikian 1992). Inasmuch as individuals are likely to be especially risk-seeking in contexts of loss, we would agree that framing situations in terms of loss may be a necessary precondition for some collective action. However, our hypotheses suggest that such framing activity may be less important in some movement contexts than in others, namely in those situations characterized by quotidian disruption. This is not only because the losses generated by quotidian disruptions are likely to be especially palpable, but also because movements precipitated by quotidian disruption may be able to draw more fully on existing situationally relevant framings since their goals are skewed toward cultural and social restoration rather than broad social change. Because of this latter consideration, the phenomenological constraints or impediments to frame resonance that Snow and Benford (1988) have identified are likely to be less of an issue for movements seeking to defend or reconstitute routines and patterns of everyday life whose cultural validity has already been established. Existing patterns of routines and corresponding natural attitudes are, almost by definition, likely to be empirically credible, experientially commensurate, and consistent with existing cultural narratives.

This is not to suggest, however, that all framing processes and issues are irrelevant to movements spawned by quotidian disruption. As implied above, neither attributional framing, which involves the definition of a condition as problematic and in need of repair, nor motivational framing may be so critical in situations of quotidian disruption. However, prognostic framing, which involves the specification of lines of response and action, prob-ably remains just as problematic in contexts of quotidian disruption as in other situations.

Additionally, the link between quotidian disruption and these core framing tasks may be more pronounced in some situations than others. While quotidian disruption invariably involves a disruption of both routines and the natural attitude, the degree to which each is fractured relative to the other may vary across situations. If the natural attitude is fractured more severely than everyday routines, such that it may not be possible to suspend doubt without first altering previous conditions in novel ways, then diagnostic and prognostic framing may be equally important. The extent to which there may be

variability in the degree to which both routines and the natural attitude are fractured is an empirical question. But we suspect that insofar as such variability exists, there will also be differences in the relative importance of the core framing tasks.

Taken together, these observations suggest that processes that are generally assumed to be operative across movements may instead be quite variable in their relative importance. If so, then clearly greater caution should be exercised when specifying or modeling the relationship between movement relevant processes and the emergence and operation of different movements.

In addition to refining our understanding of rationality, political opportunity, and framing processes in relation to social movements, we think that this paper yields a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between solidarity and breakdown. Rather than conceptualizing the two as a simple dichotomy, our thesis implies that some forms of social breakdown and solidarity are not antithetical, especially as regards mobilization for collective action. As noted at the outset of the paper, our conceptualization of breakdown as quotidian disruption differs from that which Tilly and his associates jettisoned some twenty years ago (1975). When they spoke critically about "breakdown theory," they were referring to perspectives that argue that social movements are most likely to arise among the disaffiliated and disconnected, those whose social networks and bonds of solidarity have unraveled and disintegrated. However, when we speak of breakdown or disruption, whether at the organizational or individual level, we do not presume that the actors in question are uprooted, disconnected, or isolated. To the contrary, we assume that they are variously embedded in social networks and bonds of solidarity, or at least situated structurally such that they are available for mobilization, as in the case of the homeless. Thus, what we see as disrupted or broken are patterns of everyday functioning and routinized expectancies associated with those patterns, not associational ties and bonds of solidarity.

However, there are clearly instances of quotidian disruption that so weaken existing social ties and demoralize those effected, as in the case of some forced population transfers and disasters, that collective action of any kind, and particularly sustained movement activity, is unlikely (Erikson 1976, 1994). This suggests that there is a threshold beyond which quotidian disruption and collective action are likely to be negatively related. While the existence of such a threshold remains an empirical question, we have identified four contexts of quotidian disruption that fall beneath that probable threshold and that are clearly associated with collective action.

Finally, our observations address a longstanding and vexing problem with strain theorizing: the failure to specify a determinant relationship between putative strains and social movement activity. By elaborating four sets of conditions as precipitants of quotidian disruption and linking them to a variety of reactive or restorative movements, we have theorized a determinant relationship between concrete, identifiable events, a specific kind of breakdown, and a category of social movements. And in doing so, we have provided a more theoretically refined and empirically grounded understanding of the relationship between a variant of sociocultural strain and social movement emergence, one that indicates that it is not grievances, dissatisfactions, or frustrations per se that are particularly potent for the emergence of collective action, but grievances or frustrations associated with a sense of loss arising from quotidian disruption.

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